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Abstract
This paper uses disaggregate US inflation data to evaluate explanations for the
breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation.
A dataset with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity
to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A
comparison of the 1973-1985 and 1986-2006 time periods reveals that substitution
away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with
approximately two-thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being
due to reduced energy usage, and one-third to monetary policy. We find no evidence
that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of
oil shocks, played a role.
3
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that large oil price increases played an important role in the
high US inflation rates of the 1970’s (see e.g. the textbooks by Blanchard (2009) and
Jones (2008). One popular explanation is that political events in the Middle East
caused the price of oil to rise, raising production costs and feeding through to cause
inflation in non-energy sectors of the economy.1 Panel A of Table 1 shows data on
core inflation and oil prices surrounding the two oil shocks of the 1970’s. The OPEC
oil embargo in 1973 saw a more than doubling of the price of oil, and an increase in
the core inflation rate from 2.5% in 1972 to 10.9% in 1974. The oil price spike in
1979 was accompanied by core inflation of more than 11%. It is not surprising that
oil shocks have been blamed for at least some of the high inflation in this time period.
Several authors, including Blanchard and Gali (2009), De Gregorio, Landerretche,
and Neilson (2007) and Hooker (2002), have shown that oil shocks are no longer
followed by large increases in core inflation. Looking at Panel B of Table 1, the
oil shock associated with the first Gulf War was accompanied by only a small rise
in inflation, though that example might be dismissed because the oil price spike
was both small and short-lived when compared with the earlier oil shocks. On the
other hand, the 1996-2000 period saw unprecedented oil price volatility, yet core
inflation stayed in a very tight range. The largest increase in oil prices for any of
the five episodes in Table 1 occurred in the 2002-2006 period, there was no reversal
of oil prices, and inflation stayed in the range of 1.2%-2.6%. Clearly something has
changed. Knowing why this relationship broke down is important not only because
oil prices have historically been a source of large shocks to the macroeconomy, but
because it has broader implications for our understanding of inflation and the effects
of monetary policy.
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This paper evaluates three explanations for the change in the response of inflation
to oil price shocks. We have constructed a dataset on inflation, energy intensity,
response to monetary policy shocks, and labor and capital shares for each of 97
sectors representing, nearly all of core consumption. We ask which factors have
explanatory power for the change in response to oil shocks across sectors, and calculate
the contribution of each factor to the change in the response of core CPI inflation to oil
shocks. This provides a rough measure of the relative importance of each explanation
for the breakdown.
The first explanation is that the large oil price increases of the 1970’s led to the
adoption of energy-saving technologies, reducing the importance of oil as a factor of
production relative to capital, labor, and materials. It is straightforward, given the
large decline in the use of energy to produce a given amount of output that has taken
place over the past several decades (Sue Wing (2008)), that we should expect oil
shocks to have less effect on inflation.
Second, there may have been changes in the conduct of monetary policy. The
Federal Reserve may have allowed real interest rates to fall after an oil shock in the
1970’s, or alternatively, aggressively offset the effects of oil shocks in recent years.
Bernanke (2008) summarized the evidence on the role played by monetary policy:
“Economists generally agree that monetary policy performed poorly
during this period. In part, this was because policymakers, in choosing
what they believed to be the appropriate setting for monetary policy,
overestimated the productive capacity of the economy.” (Bernanke 2008)
As emphasized by Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), evidence that monetary
policy plays a role in the transmission of oil shocks implies that the systematic part
of monetary policy, as opposed to just surprise changes in monetary policy, affects
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the economy. Beyond the direct response to oil shocks, the Federal Reserve may have
been viewed as more committed to reducing inflation starting in the 1980’s, consistent
with the evidence in Clarida, et al (2000). In other words, even if there was no change
in Federal Reserve policy, the public’s expectation of the response of monetary policy
may have changed.
Third, there may have been changes in the labor market:
“...in response to an adverse supply shock and for a given money rule,
inflation will generally rise more and output will decline more, the slower
real wages adjust. A trend towards more flexible labor markets, including
more flexible wages, could thus explain the smaller impact of the more
recent oil shocks.” (Blanchard and Gali 2009)
Given the large changes that have taken place in labor markets, this is a reasonable
explanation.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to look at this question using disag-
gregate inflation data. The variation in characteristics across the different sectors
of the US economy provides a great deal of information that is ignored when using
aggregate data. Other papers on the topic (Blanchard and Gali (2009), De Grego-
rio, Landerretche, and Neilson (2007) and Hooker (2002)) have all used aggregate
or highly aggregated data. We view this paper as complementing the work done by
those authors.
We find that the change in energy intensity and sensitivity to monetary policy
shocks both have explanatory power for the change in a given sector’s response to oil
shocks. All else constant, sectors with a bigger decline in energy intensity or a greater
sensitivity to monetary policy shocks experienced a statistically significant decline in
the response to oil shocks between the 1973-1985 and 1986-2006 time periods. Our
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estimates indicate that about two-thirds of the reduced response of core inflation to
oil shocks can be attributed to changes in energy intensity and one-third to monetary
policy. Labor intensity of production in a particular sector does not explain much of
the change, suggesting that the labor market probably did not play much of a role in
the change in inflation’s response to oil shocks.
2 Data
Monthly oil price and aggregate inflation data were downloaded from Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
oil price data is the spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude. The CPI
inflation series are the percentage change in series CPIAUCSL, the Consumer Price
Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items, and CPILFESL, the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy.
Monthly disaggregate inflation data series were downloaded from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis website, underlying detail tables, Table 2.4.4U: Chain-Type Price
Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures.2 The data include more than 300
price indexes at several levels of aggregation, ranging from very high (durables, non-
durables, and services) to very low (e.g. different types of clothing), for the period
January 1959 to July 2006. We work with the lowest level of aggregation for which
the entire economy is represented. After removing food and energy sectors, as well
as those with incomplete data, there were 97 sectors in the final dataset.
The monetary policy shock series calculated by Romer and Romer (2004) was
downloaded from the website of Professor David Romer. The other macroeconomic
data used in the paper were downloaded from FRED. The unemployment rate is UN-
RATE, the Civilian Unemployment Rate. Industrial production growth is the per-
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centage change in series INDPRO, the Industrial Production Index. Another measure
of economic activity was the first principle component of 63 monthly macroeconomic
variables related to output. The list of variables is available from the authors upon
request. The federal funds rate is FEDFUNDS, the Effective Federal Funds Rate.
3 Aggregate Inflation and Oil Shocks
3.1 Structural Break Tests
In Table 2 are the results of structural break tests for six highly aggregated inflation
rates over the period January 1959 to July 2006, allowing for a data-determined
structural break somewhere between January 1979 and December 1985 in the equation
pit = α +
k∑
i=1
βipit−i +
k∑
i=1
γi∆Oilt−i + εt.
The second and third columns are the estimated break date and corresponding ave F
test statistics for the Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) structural
break test.3 The last three columns are p-values for a test that all coefficients on the
oil shock equal zero, with the sum of γi for each subsample in parenthesis. Lag length
in each regression was selected using the Akaike information criteria (AIC).
It is hardly surprising, in light of the previously cited studies, that we find a
structural break for all of the inflation rates. The CPI, which includes energy di-
rectly, shows evidence of a structural break but does not show a “breakdown” of the
relationship, in the sense of a big decrease in the sum of coefficients. In terms of
both the p-values and sum of coefficients, however, there has clearly been a change in
the response of the core CPI to an oil shock. PCE nondurables were sensitive at all
times to oil shocks, but the response of PCE durables and services - neither of which
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directly accounts for energy prices - has largely disappeared.
We have also estimated impulse response functions using a bivariate VAR model of
inflation and the change inWTI, identified by assuming the system is recursive and the
oil shock has no contemporaneous effect on inflation (i.e., a Choleski decomposition
with inflation first in the ordering). The impulse response functions for the core
CPI, not shown because they are neither surprising or original, show a large positive
response in the pre-break period but not the post-break period.
3.2 Discussion of Identification Restrictions
The structural break tests and impulse response analysis discussed in the previous
section were carried out on bivariate VAR models and identification of the impulse
responses was achieved by applying a Choleski decomposition to the covariance matrix
of the residuals. The same assumptions underlie the disaggregate analysis below, so
we address objections to those assumptions. One criticism is that impulse response
functions identified by a Choleski decomposition can be sensitive to the ordering of
the variables. That is not the case here. The contemporaneous correlation of the
residuals of the reduced form VAR models are close to zero, consistent with the
recursiveness assumption that underlies the Choleski decomposition, meaning that
the impulse responses are largely robust to changes in the ordering of the variables.
Another criticism is that the a bivariate VAR model omits relevant information,
causing the identified oil shocks to be contaminated by shocks to macroeconomic
variables other than inflation. A bivariate VAR model allows us to estimate a par-
simonious model, which is important when analyzing small subsamples of the data,4
but it leaves open the possibility that important variables have been omitted.
In panel A of Table 3 is the contemporaneous correlation of the identified oil
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shock series with several macroeconomic variables, including the unemployment rate,
industrial production growth, growth in the first principle component from a group of
63 macroeconomic variables, the federal funds rate, and the Romer and Romer (2004)
monetary policy shock. Panel B of Table 3 summarizes regressions of the identified
oil shock on the contemporaneous and lagged values of each of those series:
εWTIt = α +
12∑
i=0
βixt−i + ηt, (1)
where x is one of the macroeconomic series.
The results in Table 3 provide no support for the claim that identified oil shocks
of a bivariate VAR model are contaminated with omitted information about the
economy. This is consistent with the finding in Kilian (2009, Figure 3) that aggregate
demand shocks have no impact on the real price of oil until eight months have passed.
Motivated by the results in this section, all of the impulse response functions below are
based on bivariate VAR models, identified by a Choleski decomposition with inflation
first in the ordering.
4 Which Factors Explain the Change in Response to
Oil Shocks?
There has been a change in the response of core inflation to oil shocks. In this section,
we use disaggregate inflation data to evaluate three explanations for the change. We
follow up with tests of two statistical explanations for the aggregate data.
10
4.1 Explanation 1: Changes in production technology
An obvious reason that oil shocks may no longer have much effect on inflation is that
firms have substituted away from oil as a factor of production. As oil prices shot up
following the embargo in October 1973, and later as firms came to realize that energy
costs were not likely to return to their previous levels, energy conservation became a
priority.5 There was a dramatic decrease in the number of BTU’s of energy used per
dollar of output in the 1970’s (see e.g. Figure 1 of Sue Wing (2008)). On the other
hand,
“To our considerable surprise, the industry-level data show that the
fixed-weight average energy cost share rose by nearly a quarter between
1972 and 1994.... In other words, the average 4-digit industry shifted
toward more energy-intensive production technologies between 1972 and
1994.” (Davis and Haltiwanger 2001)
Thus, production of a given amount of output currently uses less energy than it would
have in 1973, but that is at least partially offset by the higher price of energy. In
addition,
“The decline in the energy intensity of GDP does not seem responsible,
as a sharp reduction in the sensitivity of inflation to oil prices remains in
regressions that control for it.” (Hooker 2002)
Our energy intensity measure comes from the 35 KLEM dataset downloaded from
Professor Dale Jorgenson’s homepage.6 The 35 KLEM data include annual observa-
tions on the price of output that producers receive, the quantity of output, and the
value of capital, labor, energy, and materials inputs for each of 35 industries. Energy
intensity for a given industry is calculated as the dollar value of energy inputs di-
vided by the dollar value of total industry output. Unfortunately, the sectors in the
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disaggregate inflation dataset from the BEA are not classified by the same industry
groups as the 35 KLEM data, so we had to match the energy intensity for each sector
in our disaggregate inflation dataset with the energy intensity of the KLEM industry
sharing that sector’s SIC code.
In most cases, the SIC codes for the disaggregate inflation data were pulled from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Bridge Between NAICS and SIC, and the SIC codes for the
KLEM data were taken from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). In a few cases, a sector
in the disaggregate inflation data included more than one of the KLEM industries,
so we used the average of the energy intensity of the industries weighted according
to their expenditure shares. The variable that enters the regression, the change in
energy intensity of a sector, is the average energy intensity over 1986-2006 minus the
average energy intensity over 1973-1985.
4.2 Explanation 2: Monetary policy
A second explanation is that there was a change in the conduct of monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve, concerned with the employment effects of oil shocks, may have
followed an accommodative monetary policy in the 1970’s, or as suggested by Romer
and Romer (2002), simply lacked a proper understanding of the inflationary effects of
supply shocks. There is no consensus in the literature as to whether this is an accurate
assessment. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) concluded that the recessions of
the 1970’s would not have occurred if the Federal Reserve had not tightened monetary
policy in response to the oil shocks of that period. If Bernanke, Gertler and Watson’s
conclusion is correct, the Federal Reserve could not have been accommodating oil
shocks in the 1970’s.
Less plausible is that in recent years the Federal Reserve has acted to prevent
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changes in the price of oil from passing through to the broader economy. Blinder and
Reis (2005, pages 44-47) cast doubt on this explanation, calling Greenspan’s focus
on core inflation an “innovation”, given his belief that it did not make sense for the
Federal Reserve to respond to oil shocks. They explain:
“In the United States today, an oil shock is viewed as a ‘blip’ to the
inflation process that does not affect long-term inflationary expectations
and should mostly be ignored by the Fed because it will fade away of its
own accord.” (Blinder and Reis 2005, p. 44)
In addition, Hooker (2002) found no evidence that the Federal Reserve was less ac-
commodative of oil shocks in recent years than in the 1970’s.
Discussions of monetary policy in the 1970’s frequently emphasize the importance
of credibility. Blanchard and Gali (2009), for instance, distinguish between the actual
policy rule
it = φpipiq,t,
where i is the central bank’s interest rate target and pi is the inflation rate, and the
perceived policy rule
it = φpi (1− δ) piq,t + νt,
with 0 < δ ≤ 1. A value of δ much smaller than one in the 1973-1985 time period, but
approximately equal to one after 1985, can explain the reduced effect of oil shocks.
As the public learned about the Federal Reserve’s commitment to low inflation, oil
shocks would have had less effect, even without a change in the response of monetary
policy.
Whichever of the above explanations is correct, if monetary policy is the culprit,
the effect of oil shocks on inflation should be explained by the sensitivity of inflation
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in that sector to changes in interest rates. Sectors not responsive to monetary policy
changes should not have seen a change in their response to an oil shock.7
For each sectoral inflation rate, we estimated equation (3) in Romer and Romer
(2004), and set that sector’s sensitivity to monetary policy variable, which we call
Moni, equal to the sum of the coefficients on the monetary shock. The estimation
equation is
∆pit = a0 +
11∑
k=1
akDkt +
24∑
i=1
bi∆pi,t−i +
48∑
j=1
cjSt−j + et,
where ∆pit is the (linearly detrended) inflation rate of sector i in period t, D is a
seasonal dummy variable, S is the monetary policy shock, and Moni =
∑48
j=1 cj.
A well-known complication with identifying the effects of monetary policy shocks
on inflation is the “price puzzle”, whereby the price level rises, or stays flat, for a
significant period of time after the shock occurs (e.g. Hanson (2004)). The paper by
Romer and Romer (2004) is not different in this respect. While they did not observe
an increase in prices after a tightening of monetary policy, they did find a delay of
about 18 months before the CPI was affected by monetary policy shocks. For our
disaggregated data, we find a wide range of responses to monetary policy shocks in the
first two years, with prices in many sectors starting to fall only after about 18 months
have passed. Unlike Figure 4 of Romer and Romer (2004), the average response to
a monetary policy shock in the disaggregated data is hump-shaped, with a rise in
prices over the first 18 months, and then a dramatic decline as the horizon increases.
It is difficult to interpret the cj coefficients for low values of j, so that if we ignore the
price puzzle, we may incorrectly conclude that monetary policy played no role in the
breakdown. This is an empirical question - whether including the short-horizon and
medium-horizon responses to a monetary policy shock as separate regressors yields
a better fit can be tested. We estimate versions of (2) where Moni is replaced with
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Mon1i =
∑18
j=1 cij and Mon2i =
∑48
j=19 cij.
4.3 Explanation 3: Changes in the labor market
A third explanation is that labor markets have changed (Blanchard and Gali 2009).
The declining influence of unions, technological changes that have reduced the costs
of job search, and the disappearance of wage indexation, among other factors, are
reasons that wages are more flexible today than they were in the 1970’s. Greater
wage flexibility will cause both the output and inflation responses to an oil shock to
decline. If changes in the labor market are the primary cause of the breakdown, those
sectors with low labor share should have been largely unaffected. Labor intensity
was calculated in the same way as energy intensity, by matching the SIC codes in
our sectoral inflation dataset to the labor intensity of the industries in Jorgenson’s 35
KLEM dataset.
4.4 A note on endogeneity of oil prices
In a recent paper, Kilian (2009) argues that much of the historical variation in oil
prices can be attributed to changes in the demand for oil. He constructs an index of
global real economic activity and shows that shocks to this series have large effects
on oil prices, US GDP, and the US CPI. While Kilian makes a compelling case in
favor of the endogeneity of oil prices, and the points he makes are clearly important,
there are two reasons to be skeptical that endogeneity of oil prices can explain the
breakdown of the relationship between oil shocks and inflation that is the focus of
this paper.
First, for endogeneity of oil prices to have been the cause of the breakdown, there
would have to have been a large change in the importance of oil demand shocks
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relative to oil supply disruptions. There is no reason to believe that this type of
change has occurred. Kilian’s dataset goes back to 1975 and his results suggest that
global oil demand fluctuations explain much of the change in the price of oil around
all major oil shocks since that time.
Second, endogeneity of oil prices does not cause the same identification problems
for inflation as it does for GDP. A shock to world output will cause US output and the
price of oil to move in the same direction, while a shock to the supply of oil will cause
them to move in opposite directions. In contrast, changes in the price of oil should
be followed by movements in inflation in the same direction, regardless of whether
oil prices are responding to a shock to world output or a disruption of oil supplies
(although the impact of a given oil price movement will depend on the underlying
shock that is driving oil prices). It is therefore not clear how endogeneity of oil prices
can explain the breakdown of the relationship between oil prices and inflation.
As Kilian (2009) points out when discussing the interpretation of VAR models
with oil prices:
“Under standard assumptions, the resulting response estimates will be
asymptotically valid.... Nevertheless, since this expectation by construc-
tion reflects the average composition of oil demand and oil supply shocks
in the sample period, these estimates may be misleading, when it comes
to judging the macroeconomic effects of a specific oil price shock.” (Kilian
2009)
Our interest is not in looking at specific oil price increases, but rather in the behavior
of oil prices over samples covering many years. As we are unaware of any papers
showing how endogeneity of oil prices can serve as an explanation for the break-
down of this relationship, and given that conventional economic theory suggests that
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both increases in aggregate demand and exogenous oil supply shocks will put upward
pressure on consumer prices, we do not pursue this explanation.
4.5 Empirical Model
The estimation equation is
4IRFi = β0 + β14EIi + β2Moni + β3LIi + β4KIi + εi, (2)
where4IRFi is the change in the cumulative 12-month impulse response function for
sector i between the 1973-1985 and 1986-2006 periods; 4EIi is the change in energy
intensity of sector i between the two time periods; Moni is the response of inflation
in sector i to a monetary policy shock; LIi is the average value of labor intensity for
sector i; and KIi is the average value of capital intensity of sector i. All variables
were constructed as described above.
Our choice of methodology follows Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and Carlino and
DeFina (1998). Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) regressed the response of industry-level
employment to an oil shock on energy intensity, capital intensity, average plant size,
average plant age, and product durability. Carlino and DeFina (1998) regressed state
responses to monetary policy on a variety of variables related to monetary policy.
Our methodology is informative to the extent that the explanatory variables in (2)
are able to capture the three explanations in section 4.3.
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4.6 Empirical Results
4.6.1 Changes in Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1 is a histogram summarizing the distribution of the change in impulse response
function estimates for each of the 97 inflation rates in our sample. The horizontal axis
is the change in cumulative response of one inflation rate in the 12 months following a
doubling of the price of oil. A number on the x-axis of -0.02, for example, represents
a two percentage point decline in the estimated response of inflation between the
1973-1985 and 1986-2006 subsamples. As noted in Section 3, the impulse response
functions are identified by applying a Choleski decomposition to a bivariate VAR
model with inflation ordered ahead of the oil price change.
Figure 1 shows that the change in response of core inflation documented in previ-
ous studies was driven by a small number of sectors. Only 29% of sectors (representing
26% of core consumption) saw the response to a doubling of the price of oil fall by two
percentage points or more. On the other hand, 62% of sectors (representing 68% of
consumption) saw changes of less than two percentage points in one direction or the
other.8 Given the substantial variation across sectors, a disaggregate analysis has the
potential to provide much information that is not available with aggregate inflation
data.
Impulse response function estimates for 1959-1972 (not reported) are very impre-
cise. Both the range and magnitude of estimated impulse response functions, positive
and negative, are much larger than for either 1973-1985 or 1986-2006, and the esti-
mated parameters in the underlying VAR models have much larger standard errors.
This is almost certainly due to the limited variation in oil prices in this time period,
but poses no problems for our investigation, as our interest is in explaining changes
in the behavior of inflation between the 1973-1985 and 1986-2006 time periods.
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4.6.2 Model Estimates
Table 4 reports results for (2) and for simple regressions with 4EIi, Moni, and LIi
separately. Because Moni is the output of a previous regression, we need to make
appropriate adjustments when computing standard errors. Our procedure for the
regressions that include Mon, or Mon1 and Mon2, is as follows (for an introduction
to Bayesian methods and Gibbs Sampling, see Koop (2003) or Lancaster (2004)):
Step 1. Assuming a normal linear regression model with a vague prior, simulate one
draw of the coefficients of the Romer and Romer equation
∆pit = a0 +
11∑
k=1
akDkt +
24∑
i=1
bi∆pi,t−i +
48∑
j=1
cjSt−j + et
from a multivariate normal distribution as described by Lancaster (2004, p. 135), for
each sector i. Those coefficients are then used to calculate the response to monetary
policy shocks for each sector as above: Moni =
∑48
j=1 cj.9
Step 2. Conditional on the Moni from step 1, take a draw of the coefficients from
equation (2) , again working with a normal linear regression model and a vague prior.
Step 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 a total of 10,000 times. The means of the coefficient
draws in step 2 are the point estimates of the coefficients, and the standard deviations
are the standard errors.
The first thing to note in Table 4 is that the change in energy intensity is significant
in all regressions that it appears. The positive coefficients imply that sectors that
became less energy-intensive showed a smaller reaction to oil shocks in the later
period. For each percentage point decline in energy share, the response of inflation
to a doubling of the price of oil fell between 1.23 and 1.36 percentage points. These
estimates are reasonable. If oil shocks are completely passed on to consumers, the
coefficient should be one. If oil price increases are followed by further increases, the
19
coefficient should be greater than one.10
Mon is marginally insignificant when included in equations (2) and (5). However,
as explained above, the well-known price puzzle might cause our regressions to under-
estimate the role of monetary policy. When we allow the initial and later responses to
a monetary policy shock to enter the model separately (a specification supported by
the data, with a test of equality of coefficients on Mon1 and Mon2 easily rejected),
the coefficient on Mon2 is positive and significant. A stronger response to monetary
policy shocks (i.e., a larger decrease in the inflation rate after a given increase in
the federal funds rate) means inflation in that sector showed a weaker response to
oil shocks in the 1986-2006 time period. There is no obvious interpretation of the
coefficient on Mon1, as the delayed response of inflation to a monetary policy shock
suggests that the coefficient should be zero in our regression, and is consistent with
our results.
Neither labor intensity nor capital intensity enters the regression significantly. The
point estimate of the coefficient on labor intensity is even positive. The coefficient
should be negative if changes in the labor market were responsible for the breakdown,
as those sectors with the greatest reliance on labor should have seen the largest decline
in the impulse response function.
4.6.3 Relative Importance of Variables
The estimated coefficients in Table 4 are not easy to interpret beyond a test of statis-
tical significance. The importance of an individual variable is a function of both the
estimated coefficient and the variance of that variable. To calculate the contribution
of individual variables to the decline in response of core inflation, we have done several
counterfactual experiments. The calculations were done as follows.
Using the estimates of equation (6) in Table 4, get fitted values for ∆IRF for all
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sectors using the actual data. Calculate the sum of these predicted values, denoted
∆ ̂IRFi, weighted by expenditure shares wi:
∆IRFActual =
97∑
i=1
wi∆ ̂IRFi.
Now set the ∆EI series to zero for all observations, and make predictions for all
observations, denoted 4 ̂IRFEIi . The predicted change in the effect of an oil shock
on core inflation with no change in energy intensity is
∆IRFEnergy =
97∑
i=1
wi∆
̂IRFEIi .
The effect of changes in energy intensity on the change in response to oil shocks,
reported in the bottom panel of Table 4, is
∆IRFActual −∆IRFEnergy.
A similar measure is constructed for the Mon1 and Mon2 variables by setting
the Mon1 and Mon2 variables to zero. This is the same as asking what would have
happened to4IRF if none of the sectors were responsive to monetary policy. Because
there is no natural benchmark change in labor intensity to use in a counterfactual
exercise to assess the importance of changes in the labor market, we reduced labor
intensity for all observations by one standard deviation.
The results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4. The numbers are the
contribution of each variable to the change in the response of aggregate core inflation
after a doubling of the price of oil. Our results indicate that substitution away from
energy in production is the primary reason that oil shocks no longer pass through to
core inflation. The change in energy intensity explains twice as much of the break-
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down as monetary policy (-1.12% for 4EI versus -0.57% for Mon2). Labor intensity
explains only a trivial portion of the breakdown (4EI explains 14 times as much as
labor intensity).
In addition to the changes that took place within individual sectors, there has also
been a change in the composition of consumption. A shift away from energy-intensive
manufacturing to services, for instance, represents a reduction in energy consumption
that would be expected to cause IRF to fall. One way to address this issue is to
calculate how much the response of aggregate inflation in the 1973-1985 period would
have changed if consumption shares in the 1973-1985 period were instead equal to
their 1986-2006 values. Letting IRF 7385i be the impulse response function of sector
i during the 1973-1985 time period and 4wi be the change in average consumption
share of sector i between 1973-1985 and 1986-2006, we can calculate
97∑
i=1
4wiIRF 7385i .
This provides a rough estimate of how much the response of aggregate inflation
changed due to a shift to sectors that are less sensitive to oil shocks. For our dataset,
this calculation suggests that the response of aggregate inflation would have been
only 0.16 percentage points lower in the 1973-1985 period if consumption shares had
been at their 1986-2006 levels instead of their 1973-1985 levels. There does not ap-
pear to have been enough movement away from energy-intensive sectors to explain
the breakdown of the oil price-inflation relationship.
4.7 Statistical explanations
This section considers two statistical explanations for the breakdown. It is possible
that what appears to be a change in the effects of oil shocks may actually be the result
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of a small number of influential observations in one of the time periods. Alternatively,
a large change in the persistence of oil shocks could cause a change in the estimated
impulse response function. Suppose that the only response of inflation in either time
period following a doubling of the price of oil is an immediate, permanent increase of
one percentage point, pit = 0.01Oilt, with no delayed response. In the early period, a
doubling of the price of oil was followed by a 50% increase in the price of oil in the
next month. In the recent period, a doubling of the price of oil was reversed over the
next month.
The estimated 12-month cumulative impulse response function in this example
would be 1.5% in the first period and 0% in the second. Even though the impulse
response functions have changed, that change is driven entirely by a change in the
time series behavior of the oil price, and has nothing to do with either the process
generating inflation or passthrough of oil shocks to inflation. For example, the oil
shock around the first Gulf War was short-lived relative to the oil shocks of the
1970’s, and if this were true of all oil shocks in the 1986-2006 period, it could by itself
explain the breakdown.
We have tested both of these explanations. We have redone the Granger causality
tests of Table 2 for the core CPI in the two time periods, with observations having the
largest Cook’s distance measure being successively removed. Between one and ten
potential outliers were eliminated. There is no evidence that the change in the effects
of oil shocks on inflation was the result of outliers in either of the time periods. Even
when the 10 largest potential outliers are removed, oil shocks have forecast power for
the core CPI in the first time period, but not the second. Estimating impulse response
functions for the core CPI using the VAR model discussed in Section 3, we find no
major change in the persistence of oil shocks across the two time periods, certainly
not in a way sufficient to explain the substantial change in the oil price-core inflation
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relationship. The 95% confidence intervals for the impulse response functions overlap
at all horizons. These results are available from the authors upon request.
5 Conclusion
There has been a well-documented change in the effect of oil shocks on core CPI
inflation. The oil shocks of the 1970’s were followed by large increases in inflation,
but for data after 1986, the response is much weaker or even nonexistent. We con-
structed measures of energy intensity, labor intensity, capital intensity, and sensitivity
of inflation to monetary policy shocks for each sector of a dataset on inflation at a
low level of aggregation. Changes in energy intensity and sensitivity to monetary
policy shocks were found to be important determinants of the change in a sector’s
response to oil shocks between the 1973-1985 and 1986-2006 time periods. About
two-thirds of the reduced response of aggregate inflation was due to the adoption of
energy-conserving production methods and one-third to changes related to monetary
policy. Given the dramatic decline in the inflationary effects of oil shocks, and the
fact that much of that decline was due to energy conservation, future research might
investigate the implications of government policies designed to reduce the economy’s
reliance on energy.
We have offered two explanations for our finding of the importance of monetary
policy. The first is that the Federal Reserve accomodated oil shocks in the 1970’s.
Given the high (9% by April 1975) and rapidly rising (3.9 percentage points from
April 1974 to April 1975) unemployment rates at that time, there was substantial
pressure on the Federal Reserve to pursue an expansionary monetary policy, and
they may have decided that double-digit inflation was of secondary importance. Al-
ternatively, the Federal Reserve may have lacked credibility, causing the public to
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expect a weak monetary policy response. In the later time period, after the pub-
lic learned the Federal Reserve’s reaction function, oil shocks were less inflationary.
Both explanations point to the importance of systematic monetary policy, as argued
by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997).
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Notes
1See e.g. Barsky and Kilian (2002) for an alternative interpretation of what happened in the
1970’s.
2The BEA made important changes to the data in 2009. The data used in this paper can be found
at http://www.bea.gov/histdata/Releases/GDP_and_PI/2008/Q4/Final_March-26-2009/UND/Section2ALL_xls.xls.
3The break date was chosen by grid search to minimize the sum of squared errors. Using the sup
F or exp F tests has no effect on the test results. For further details, see Zeileis, et al (2002).
4For the 1973-1985 time period, for example, we have only 156 observations.
5Energy prices began rising well in advance of the 1973 embargo. President Nixon gave a speech
in 1971 in which he said,
“...the assumption that sufficient energy will always be readily available has been
brought sharply into question within the last year....the possible shortages of fuel that
were threatened last fall, the sharp increases in certain fuel prices...have all demon-
strated that we cannot take our energy supply for granted any longer.” (Nixon 1971)
Nonetheless, the price spike accompanying the 1973 shock was much larger and received more at-
tention than previous energy price changes.
6The data were downloaded in 2007 from http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data.html.
7Our methodology is limited, in that it only captures the effects of monetary policy that follow
from a change in interest rates, yet monetary policy can affect the economy in other ways.
8We are making no claims about whether a change in the response to an oil shock of two per-
centage points is in some economic sense “small”. What is relevant for the purposes of this paper
is that the change in response of aggregate inflation was actually a change in less than 30% of the
economy.
9The sectoral inflation rates are linearly detrended. Some of the inflation rates exhibited obvious
trends.
10To see this, assume that energy’s share falls from 5% to 4%. The effect of a doubling of the
price of oil will fall by one percentage point, from 5% to 4%. If a doubling of the price of oil at time
t is followed by an additional 36% rise in period t + 1, the estimated coefficient will be 1.36. The
actual inflation process is no doubt more complicated than this simple example, but the estimated
coefficient (making allowance for sampling error) is in an economically sensible range.
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Change in Response to Mon
Sector Name IRF Policy Shock
New domestic autos -0.061 -0.008
New foreign autos -0.061 -0.008
Net transactions in used autos 0.071 0.010
Used auto margin 0.086 0.012
Employee reimbursement 0.002 -0.018
Trucks, new and net used 0.008 -0.009
Recreational vehicles -0.017 -0.045
Tires and tubes -0.023 -0.039
Accessories and parts 0.004 -0.017
Major household appliances -0.015 -0.013
Small electric appliances -0.011 -0.005
Video and audio goods, including musical instruments 0.001 -0.023
Floor coverings 0.019 -0.036
Durable house furnishings, n.e.c. -0.012 -0.028
Writing equipment 0.008 0.008
Hand tools 0.004 -0.018
Sports and photographic equipment, bicycles -0.057 -0.016
and motorcycles
Pleasure boats and aircraft -0.017 -0.046
Clothing and sewing for females 0.008 -0.003
Luggage for females -0.115 -0.064
Men’s and boys’ clothing, sewing goods, and luggage, 0.002 0.002
except military issue
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Table 1: Oil Shocks and Core CPI Inflation in Selected Time Periods
a: Early Period
Year ∆WTI ∆PCore Year ∆WTI ∆PCore
1971 0% 3.3% 1978 0% 8.2%
1972 0% 2.5% 1979 78.3% 11.3%
1973 104.4% 5.0% 1980 15.6% 10.7%
1974 9.9% 10.9% 1981 -11.6% 8.8%
1975 0% 6.7% 1982 -8.2% 4.5%
b: Recent Period
Year ∆WTI ∆PCore Year ∆WTI ∆PCore Year ∆WTI ∆PCore
1987 -8.4% 4.2% 1996 28.8% 2.5% 2002 51.6% 1.9%
1988 4.7% 4.5% 1997 -41.0% 2.2% 2003 4.0% 1.2%
1989 23.0% 4.3% 1998 -29.3% 2.3% 2004 31.2% 2.2%
1990 9.7% 5.5% 1999 77.9% 2.1% 2005 33.5% 2.1%
1991 -28.2% 3.9% 2000 8.5% 2.5% 2006 4.3% 2.6%
Notes: 4WTI is the percentage change in the spot price of West Texas Intermediate
crude oil. 4PCore is the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food & Energy. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
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Table 2: Structural Break Tests for Aggregate Inflation Data
Variable Break Date ave F pre-Break post-Break 1986-2006
CPI Feb 1980 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Core CPI Mar 1980 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.52
(0.034) (0.000) (0.003)
PCE Deflator Jan 1981 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
PCE Durables Feb 1980 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.49
(0.028) (0.002) (0.002)
PCE Nondurables Feb 1981 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.007) (0.051) (0.051)
PCE Services May 1984 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.06
(0.018) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: The estimated model is
pit = α +
k∑
i=1
βipit−i +
k∑
i=1
γi4Oilt−i + εt
where k is chosen to minimize the Akaike information criteria. The second and third
columns are the estimated break date and p-value for the Andrews (1993) structural
break test on (γ1, ..., γk) . Columns 4 and 5 are the p-values for a test of γ1 = · · · =
γk = 0 on the pre-break and post-break subsamples. Column 6 is the p-value for a
test of γ1 = · · · = γk = 0 for the 1986-2006 subsample. The sum of coefficients on the
oil shock is in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Validity of Identified Oil Shocks
A: Correlations of identified oil shock
with macroeconomic variables
corr
(
εWTIt , ut
)
-0.05
corr
(
εWTIt ,4IPt
)
0.00
corr
(
εWTIt ,4PC1t
)
0.00
corr
(
εWTIt , FFRt
)
-0.01
corr
(
εWTIt , s
Romer
t
)
0.01
B: Regressions of identified oil shock
on macroeconomic variables
Variable Name R2 F-stat p-value
u 0.02 0.75 0.71
4IP 0.02 0.65 0.81
4PC1 0.02 0.76 0.70
FFR 0.02 0.72 0.74
sRomer 0.02 0.52 0.91
Notes: The variables are the identified oil shock
(
εWTI
)
, the total civilian unemploy-
ment rate (u) , industrial production growth (4IP ) , the growth rate of the first prin-
ciple component of 63 macroeconomic series (4PC1) , the effective federal funds rate
(FFR) , and the monetary policy shock series of Romer and Romer (2004)
(
sRomer
)
.
The regressions in panel B are for equation (1) in the text.
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Table 4: Explaining the Change in Response to Oil Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β0 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(-0.44) (-1.47) (-0.77) (-0.86) (-1.17) (-1.13)
4EI 1.29 1.36 1.23
(2.16) (2.23) (2.00)
Mon 0.44 0.35
(1.88) (1.66)
Mon1 0.00 -0.17
(0.00) (-0.32)
Mon2 0.60 0.52
(2.38) (2.22)
LI 0.01 0.05 0.06
(0.18) (0.81) (1.04)
KI 0.08 0.06
(1.11) (0.94)
F-stat 4.64 8.60 4.68 0.03 3.29 2.93
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.86 0.01 0.02
R2 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.14
Contribution of Variables to Change in Response of Inflation
4EI -1.12%
Mon1 -0.06%
Mon2 -0.57%
LI -0.08%
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in IRFi between the 1973-1985 period
and the 1986-2006 period, where IRFi is the cumulative 12-month impulse response
function for inflation in sector i following a shock that doubles the price of oil. The
bottom panel is the change in the response of aggregate inflation to oil shocks that
is due to each of the variables. The variables are the change in energy share between
1973-1985 and 1986-2006 (4EI), response to monetary policy shocks (Mon1 and
Mon2), labor intensity (LI), and capital intensity (KI). t-statistics are in parenthesis.
There are 97 observations in each regression.
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Change in Response to Mon
Sector Name IRF Policy Shock
Standard clothing issued to military personnel -0.010 -0.007
Soap -0.017 -0.003
Cosmetics and perfumes -0.010 0.002
Other personal hygiene goods -0.004 -0.011
Cleaning preparations -0.125 -0.008
Lighting supplies 0.020 -0.005
Paper products -0.180 -0.020
Prescription drugs -0.003 -0.003
Nonprescription drugs 0.004 -0.009
Medical supplies -0.001 -0.008
Gynecological goods -0.003 -0.011
Toys, dolls, and games -0.058 -0.017
Sport supplies, including ammunition -0.054 -0.017
Film and photo supplies -0.004 -0.008
Stationery and school supplies -0.160 -0.018
Greeting cards -0.160 -0.019
Expenditures abroad by U.S. residents -0.202 -0.042
Less: Personal remittances in kind to nonresidents -0.008 -0.026
Magazines and sheet music 0.012 0.011
Newspapers -0.102 -0.011
Owner occupied mobile homes 0.006 -0.003
Owner occupied stationary homes 0.006 -0.002
Tenant occupied mobile homes -0.002 -0.001
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Change in Response to Mon
Sector Name IRF Policy Shock
Tenant occupied stationary homes 0.002 -0.001
Tenant landlord durables 0.012 0.000
Hotels and motels 0.007 -0.037
Clubs and fraternity housing -0.013 -0.003
Higher education housing -0.003 -0.001
Elementary and secondary education housing 0.040 0.028
Tenant group room and board -0.005 -0.004
Tenant group employee lodging 0.015 -0.022
Water and other sanitary services 0.005 0.009
Telephone and telegraph -0.010 0.008
Domestic service -0.042 -0.011
Other other household operation -0.044 0.003
Repair, greasing, washing, parking, storage, -0.040 -0.012
rental, and leasing
Other user-operated transportation -0.053 0.128
Mass transit systems 0.006 0.002
Taxicab -0.075 -0.025
Railway -0.093 -0.014
Bus 0.009 0.032
Airline 0.022 -0.045
Other intercity purchased transportation 0.011 0.000
Hospitals -0.007 -0.013
Nursing homes -0.034 -0.037
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Change in Response to Mon
Sector Name IRF Policy Shock
Medical care and hospitalization 0.043 0.027
Income loss 0.202 0.052
Workers’ compensation 0.000 -0.009
Motion picture theaters 0.001 0.001
Legitimate theaters and opera, and entertainments of -0.009 0.001
nonprofit institutions (except athletics)
Spectator sports 0.013 0.002
Radio and television repair -0.005 0.003
Clubs and fraternal organizations -0.013 -0.047
Commercial participant amusements 0.023 -0.010
Pari-mutuel net receipts 0.020 0.012
Other other recreation 0.007 -0.012
Cleaning, storage, and repair of clothing and shoes -0.016 -0.015
Barbershops, beauty parlors, and health clubs 0.005 0.001
Other personal care -0.024 -0.013
Brokerage charges and investment counseling -0.004 -0.082
Bank service charges, trust services, and safe deposit box rental 0.034 -0.004
Services furnished without payment by financial intermediaries -0.042 -0.008
except life insurance carriers
Expense of handling life insurance and pension plans -0.040 0.003
Legal services 0.003 -0.004
Funeral and burial expenses -0.024 -0.018
Other personal business -0.018 -0.015
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Change in Response to Mon
Sector Name IRF Policy Shock
Higher education -0.006 -0.013
Nursery, elementary, and secondary schools -0.008 -0.019
Other education and research -0.097 -0.052
Political organizations -0.034 -0.064
Museums and libraries 0.042 -0.050
Foundations to religion and welfare -0.006 -0.026
Social welfare -0.147 -0.028
Religion -0.028 -0.049
Foreign travel by U.S. residents -0.039 -0.042
Expenditures in the U.S. by nonresidents 0.016 -0.014
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Figure 1: Histogram of Changes in Sectoral Inflation Rate Responses
Change in Impulse Response Function
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